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Abstract 
 
Cross-national regressions reveal abnormally low agricultural workforce shares, given GNP, 
in developing countries that had historically concentrated land into large capital-intensive 
farms. We argue that such deagriculturalisation was premature, since its concomitant labour 
shedding has undesirable outcomes. In a new South African survey, a large proportion of ru-
ral households (and working-age persons) was ‘dependent’, relying for income almost wholly 
on either migrant remittances or pensions. A separate group (with less poverty and unem-
ployment) relied mainly on local, including own-farm, income. The group was heavily over-
represented in one of the three regions, where many more households had significant land. 
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1. Introduction 
Economic development is normally associated with a declining share of agriculture in both 
workforce and output. After confirming this for a cross-section of developing and transitional 
countries, we establish a strong negative association, controlling for GNP/capita, between 
land inequality and agriculture’s workforce share (section 2). High land inequality, originat-
ing from enforced land transfers in early development, is linked to abnormally low agricul-
tural workforce shares, given GNP/capita, in Latin America, FSU countries, and Southern Af-
rica.  
If such workforce deagriculturalisation arises early in development, alternative employment-
based livelihoods are likely to be insufficient to sustain rural populations. Rural dependency, 
defined as heavy dependence on transfers from outside the rural area, accompanied by high 
unemployment, is one plausible outcome. Others include mass emigration (nineteenth-century 
Ireland), concentration in urban favelas, , and low-income rural stagnation with ‘distress di-
versification’. Since all these outcomes appear undesirable, and involve agricultural shrinkage 
before other productive sectors can adequately absorb the shed farm labour, we call such 
cases ‘premature deagriculturalisation’ (PDA). 1 
To explore the processes, we must go beyond international cross-sections. Section 3 uses a South 
African survey [Kirsten et al. 2002] in a former ‘homeland’ area of Limpopo Province where 
deagriculturalisation has indeed led to rural dependency. 2 This outcome has been favoured by 
universal pension rights and a high-employment, even if capital-intensive, mining sector, so 
that many rural households survive by ‘specialising’ in receiving migrant remittances or pen-
                                                 
1Among other unwanted side-effects, deficient rural earning opportunities stimulated urban slum growth (and as-
sociated unemployment and crime) – but not emigration. South Africa is a net immigrant country, partly because 
of sluggish agricultural earning opportunities elsewhere in Africa.   
2Recent sharp falls in agricultural employment suggest that rural dependency, although a long-run effect of land 
distributions associated with apartheid, may have intensified since its demise. Total paid farm employment fell 
only slowly in 1985-93 (from 1.32m to 1.14m). However, from 1994 to 2001, total employment in agriculture, 
fisheries and forestry - including self-employment - dropped by some 66%. [Vink and Kirsten 1999]. 
 3
sions. But is there a prima facie link between rural dependency and land inequality? In Lim-
popo Province, the estimated land Gini is 0.93 (Appendix), higher than almost any estimate 
worldwide [IFAD 2001: 117-9].3 The Limpopo survey was part of a comparative study,4 so 
we compare some Limpopo results with analogous data from Rajasthan, India [Sagar 2002], 
with less extreme land inequality and no evidence of rural dependency. In rural Rajasthan, 
83% of income is local (i.e. factor income of residents); in Limpopo, only 44%. Own-farm in-
come accounts for almost all the difference. Limpopo income depends heavily on remittances and 
pensions, and to a lesser extent on rural civil service salaries; unemployment is very high. The ru-
ral non-farm (RNF) sector in Limpopo is not taking up the slack in employment or income. 
Much of rural Asia experienced transition from heavy dependence on farm income to ‘ma-
ture’ deagriculturalisation, as prior growth of labour-intensive small-scale farming stimulated 
labour-intensive RNF growth5 through forward, backward and consumption linkages [Mellor 
1976]. This connection is supported by many micro-studies [Bell et al. 1982; Hazell and Roell 
1983; Harriss 1987; Hazell and Ramasamy 1991] and by national studies of rural industriali-
zation in China [Byrd et al. 1990] and ‘proto-industrialisation’ in fifteenth-century Flanders 
and elsewhere [Kriedte et al 1981; Ogilvie et al 1996]. Yet deagriculturalisation in the Lim-
popo survey area has brought, not other local income, but widespread household dependency 
on transfer payments alongside high adult unemployment, especially in the sub-regions with 
least widely distributed farmland. This suggests that the reduced agricultural workforce share 
                                                 
3In South Africa, 15% of farmland is divided among about a million mainly African farm operators (mostly part-
time), leaving 85% of land with some 60,000 white commercial farmers outside the surveyed (smallholding) ar-
eas [NDA 2001; Department of Land Affairs, 2002]. About 2% of land in large white-owned farms in 1994 had 
been redistributed up to the end of 2001, only about 5% of it through DLA projects and the rest through private 
transactions. 
4This paper derives from EU-supported research on the impact - on fertility, migration, and thus and otherwise 
agro-environmental sustainability - of land and asset size and distribution in selected rural drylands of Limpopo 
province, Rajasthan , and Botswana. 
5Such healthy RNF growth may also be happening in parts of sub-Saharan Africa [Reardon 1997; Bryceson 
2000; Reardon and Barrett 2000] where land is less unequal than in Limpopo. 
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was premature – as was its main cause, separation of most rural households from significant 
control over land, leading to labour displacement by big, capital-intensive farms. 
In providing survey evidence on possible effects of deagriculturalisation in South Africa, we 
say little about the processes causing extreme land inequality and labour extrusion. Some-
times de-agriculturalisation is a harbinger of development [Bryceson and Jamal (eds.), 1997], 
but there may be less benign explanations connected to human agency. Colonial land grab is 
the most obvious candidate. The literature on ‘deagrarianisation’ and ‘depeasantisation’ ar-
gues that they were “sparked by ‘turning point’ policies in South Africa during the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries”.6 As in Latin America and the FSU, so in South Africa: it was 
mainly political land seizures, not labour flight to new non-farm opportunities, that led to dis-
placement of smallholders by large farms. Most black farmers were forced off their land, 
which was subsequently farmed in large holdings by whites, well before new industrial em-
ployment became available. White farm expansion, sometimes ‘led’ by wars of conquest, fu-
elled this process well before the 1913 Land Act, which confined over 85 per cent of farmland 
to whites. Subsequent expulsions of rural Africans, often into ‘dumping grounds’ offering un-
attractive farming prospects, continued until the 1980s. Some of the extruded labour was ab-
sorbed in mining, and from the 1940s in industry; until the 1940s, indeed, policies of forcing 
blacks off the land (leading to larger and more capital-intensive farms) were defended on 
grounds of ‘labour shortage’. However, from the 1960s clear ‘labour surplus’ emerged. Popu-
lation growth, continued forced removals of blacks from their farms, and rising displacement 
of labour by capital on white farms outweighed new off-farm prospects, leading to large and 
rising unemployment (now around 30%). Little land redistribution has occurred since the end 
                                                 
6Bryceson [2000]. She defines ‘deagrarianisation’ “as a process of occupational adjustment, income-earning re-
orientation, social identification and spatial relocation of rural dwellers away from strictly agricultural-based 
modes of livelihood”, whereas “‘depeasantisation’ represents a specific form of deagrarianisation in which peas-
antries lose their economic capacity and social coherence, and shrink in size”. 
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of apartheid in 1994. We defer discussion of current land policy to the concluding section of 
the paper. 
2. Land distribution, GNP per head and agricultural salience: the international evidence 
 
In this section we use cross-national regressions to investigate the following hypotheses:  
(a) the share of agriculture in GDP is inversely related to GNP per capita,  
(b) the share of agriculture in total workforce is inversely related to GNP per capita,  
(c) high land inequality depresses the output share of agriculture, 
(d) high land inequality depresses the workforce share of agriculture.  
What theory and micro evidence might generate such regularities? (a) and (b) can arise in ei-
ther a standard 2x2 Heckscher-Ohlin model or a two-good specific-factors model [Krugman 
and Obstfeld, 2003: ch.3], with countries identical in either case except for exogenous differ-
ences in factor endowments. In the specific-factors framework, with manufactures produced 
by capital and labour and food by land and labour, it must be cross-country variations in capi-
tal per head rather than land per head that matter (otherwise land-rich countries will have both 
high GNP/head and high output and workforce shares in agriculture).7  
(c) and (d) do not arise in a constant-returns-to-scale, perfect-competition world. There, farm 
size is indeterminate and variations in its distribution have no effect. In particular, the distri-
bution of owned land has no impact on the distribution of operated land. However, we know  
that (i) farm size varies a great deal within countries and (ii) factor productivities vary sys-
tematically with it - e.g. the ‘inverse relationship’ [Heltberg 1998]. A good theory should ex-
plain both (i) and (ii). While land heterogeneity is, and non-constant technical returns to scale 
may be, important, the literature emphasizes transactions costs in factor and output markets. 
                                                 
7A specific-factors model, with agricultural capital unimportant, becomes less plausible as development pro-
ceeds. Empirical H-O models explaining agriculture’s trade share include Leamer 1984, Lal and Myint 1996, 
Wood 1994.  
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For such costs to explain both (i) and (ii), imperfections in two markets are needed.8 Eswaran 
and Kotwal [1986] assume perfect rental markets in labour and land but household-specific 
capital endowments (including owned land) together with convex supervision costs for non-
family labour, and then show how agriculture will differentiate into four classes according to 
capital endowments. Richer households operate larger farms with lower labour-land ratios. 
Historical evidence [Binswanger et. al. 1995] supports such a causal link from owned land 
inequality to operated land inequality.  
How does land inequality affect agricultural employment and output? The aggregate labour-
land ratio equals the weighted sum of labour-land ratios for different farm sizes, the weights 
being the shares of total land in each size class. A labour-land ratio falling with farm size does 
not guarantee that an equalizing land redistribution raises total employment, since the shares 
of total land at both ends of the distribution may be reduced (Appendix). For any given equal-
izing redistribution, the more sharply the labour-land ratio falls with farm size, the more likely 
is total farm employment to rise; and the more sharply the output-land ratio falls with farm 
size, the more likely is total farm output to rise.  
In developing countries, with increasing farm size the labour-land ratio falls sharply. In Paki-
stan in 1972, it fell from 9.15 workers/hectare on farms below 0.4 ha to 0.12 workers/hectare 
on farms above 60.7 ha; data for Bangladesh, Thailand, Indonesia and India were comparable. 
Simulations showed that egalitarian redistribution would raise labour demand and use by 19-
24% in Bangladesh, Pakistan, Thailand and the Outer Islands of Indonesia, though by only 
8.6% in Java [Booth and Sundrum 1984: 100-109, 279-80]. A plausible model of partial land 
redistribution on Brazil’s estate sub-sector raised person-year equivalents of labour use in ag-
riculture from 2.6 to 3.0 million over the 1978 base case [Kutcher and Scandizzo 1981: 201]. 
This confirms Berry and Cline [1979:58]: labour use ‘could be expected to rise as the result of 
                                                 
8One imperfection is insufficient. E.g. non-tradability of (family) labour, gives heterogeneity in farm size - large 
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measures that redistributed land from the large-farm sector into smaller family farms’. World 
Bank evidence from the 1970s showed ‘employment per hectare higher..in those countries 
that have..more equal distribution of land ownership’ [ibid:37]. Analogously, land productiv-
ity falls as farm size rises,9 although part of this fall reflects exogenously higher land quality 
on smaller farms.10  
So greater land inequality is associated with lower output and lower employment in agricul-
ture. The latter clearly implies a lower share of workforce there. For output, however, greater 
farm size inequality might affect non-agricultural output, complicating any conclusion about 
the effect on the agricultural output share. Very unequal farmland might well, by stimulating 
capital-intensity in farming and thus attracting capital into agriculture, reduce capital available 
to support non-farm output, making the effect on the agricultural output share of GDP inde-
terminate.11  
Our hypotheses, and the discussion above, have emphasized the effects of land inequality, ig-
noring mean farm size. That would be justifiable for a single country, assuming that redistri-
bution would not change the total number of holdings, but across countries we cannot use that 
reasoning. We therefore test whether the land Gini drives out farm size as an explanatory 
variable. It does (see below), but why? Large mean farm size is found in countries with 
greater land abundance, which as such normally increases farm workforce and output; yet 
given land abundance larger farm size, e.g. due to land clearances, reduces workforce and 
output per hectare. Our econometric findings may indicate that these offsetting effects on ag-
riculture’s share in total workforce and output are approximately in balance.  
                                                                                                                                                        
families have large farms - but all physical ratios are scale-invariant. 
9See above sources and Binswanger et al. [1995]. Booth [2002:85] shows ‘post-Green-Revolution’ Indonesian 
farm income/ha. steadily falling from Rp718,000 on holdings below 0.1 ha to Rp23,000 above 4.5 ha. Land pro-
ductivity falls less sharply than the labour-land ratio, since labour productivity rises. 
10However, some endogenous differences - smaller, labour-intensive farms doing more to upgrade their land - 
are implied by higher yields on smaller holdings on land of similar region, type or quality [Binswanger et al. 
1995; Lipton 1993; Berry and Cline 1979]. 
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Table 1 shows the cross-country regressions relating workforce and GDP shares of agriculture 
to GNP/head and land inequality (regressions containing grossly insignificant regressors are 
not reported).12 Land inequality is measured by the farmland Gini coefficient where available 
(49 countries), but we also try dummy variables for Latin America, the former Soviet bloc, 
and South Africa, where past policies to shift agriculture into large farms have led to high 
inequality and the use of capital-intensive production methods. Note the caveat that our re-
sults are potentially vulnerable to unobserved heterogeneity.  If country-specific factors that 
affect agriculture's shares in workforce and GDP are correlated with our included regressors, 
the estimated coefficients are biased. 
 
Table 1: National output and workforce shares in agriculture 
 
 
Regression no. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Dep. Var:      
Ag share of GDP workforce workforce workforce 
 
     
LnGNP/cap -11.98(-12.13)*** -21.87(-11.43)*** -16.23(-6.10)*** -20.90(-9.59)*** 
Landgini  -48.18(-6.65)***  -42.90(-4.68)*** 
SAdum -3.81(-4.18)***  -24.07(-4.57)***  
LAdum   -19.24(-4.12)*** -4.61(-0.94) 
TRANSdum   -26.20(-5.99)***  
     
Nobs 105 49 109 49 
R-squared 
 
0.65 0.81 0.73 0.81 
 
Notes:  
(1) All equations estimated by weighted OLS using square roots of workforce as weights; t-
statistics in brackets. 
(2) All equations pass Ramsey RESET test, using the second, third and fourth powers of 
 the dependent variable, at 5% significance. 
(3) Heteroscedasticity corrected S.E.s in eqns 1 and 3 only, on the basis of the 
 Cook-Weisberg test. 
(4) ***=sig 1% 
 
 
Equation 1 shows that a 10% rise in GNP per capita is associated with a fall in the agricultural 
output share of 1.2% of GDP, supporting hypothesis (a). However, neither the Gini coeffi-
                                                                                                                                                        
11By symmetry, the release of labour from agriculture might raise non-agricultural output by lowering wages. 
Such effects may be assumed to be small in labour-surplus economies. 
12We include all countries with available data. To allow for variations in country size we weight observations by 
the square root of total workforce. If countries may be viewed as aggregates of independent regions, then the er-
ror variance decreases with country size suggesting this initial heteroscedasticity correction [Blanchet 1988].  
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cient of operated land, nor the Latin American or Transitional dummies, have any impact: hy-
pothesis (c) is not supported.13 South Africa is a significant outlier (see the dummy in equa-
tion 1); the fitted share of agriculture in GDP for SA is 7.1%, compared with the actual share 
of 3.3%.  
On the share of agriculture in workforce, equations 2 and 3 support hypotheses (b) and (d). In 
equation 2, a rise of 10% in GNP/capita lowers agriculture's workforce share by 2.2 percent-
age points, and a 1 percentage point rise in the Gini of operated land lowers it by 0.48 per-
centage points. Equation 3 uses blunt instruments - dummy variables - instead of the land 
Gini, allowing the inclusion of many more countries, and this reduces the estimated 
GNP/capita effect by about a quarter; there are large effects from our land inequality proxies – 
19-27% for the Latin American and Transitional groupings, and for South Africa. Lacking 
land Ginis for the last two, we can compare the dummy variable and land Gini explanations 
only for Latin America. Equation 4 shows conclusively that land inequality, rather than ‘Latin 
Americanness’, accounts for the low agricultural workforce shares there. The weighted mean 
of the land Gini for the 17 Latin American countries in our sample is 0.83, compared with 
0.51 in the other 31 countries,14 so the estimated average effect of land inequality in Latin 
American countries, using equation 2, is to lower the agricultural workforce share by 14.7% 
(the dummy variable regression suggests a somewhat larger effect).  
When mean farm size is added to the equations, it is everywhere insignificant. This is perhaps 
not surprising, as discussed above. However, the land Gini and mean farm size are highly 
(nonlinearly) correlated - the sample rank correlation is 0.71- so to some extent the superior 
statistical performance of the Gini may be an artifact of the linearity of our estimating equa-
tions. 
                                                 
13These results might have been distorted by cross-country variation in the share of extractive industry in non-
agricultural GDP, but this variable had no statistical significance when included in our equations. 
14The unweighted means are 0.82 and 0.56. 
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3. An analytical anatomy of rural African livelihoods in Limpopo province 
 
The cross-country evidence suggests a strong association between unequal land and the em-
ployment share in agriculture, given GNP per head. This does not imply that ‘deagriculturali-
sation’ has even occurred in any given case, still less that it has been ‘premature’. High land 
inequality could theoretically arise from the spread of large settler ranches into empty land, 
but, in practice, self-serving ‘terra nullius’ interpretations of history have been found want-
ing.15 The apartheid era in South Africa provides an extreme example of forced concentration 
of land and other non-labour agricultural resources in large farms with low labour-land ratios. 
Our case study of livelihoods in one of the affected areas aims to shed light on whether dea-
griculturalisation in this case was premature. 
3.1 The household sample and the survey area 
This 1999-2000 survey is confined to African households in the former Lebowa homeland ar-
eas of Limpopo Province. Twenty-four villages in seven arid or semi-arid provincial sub-
districts (see map) were randomly selected from the 1996 census list of villages. 585 ran-
domly selected households were interviewed,16 containing 4,338 persons, 5.2% of the vil-
lages’ population. The villages are largely isolated and remote, with low levels of develop-
ment. Despite lacking basic infrastructure (good roads, electricity, water), most villages have 
experienced some improvement since 1996 through targeted government investment.  
For some purposes, we cluster the sub-districts into three ‘regions’: West, South and Cen-
tral.17  
•  ‘West’ (sub-districts Mokerong and Phalala) comprises areas west of the provincial capi-
tal, Polokwane (Pietersburg). African-farmed and white-farmed areas alike are relatively 
                                                 
15
 See, for example, Bennett and Powell[1999], Reynolds[2003] 
16The proportion of households selected differed across villages. Unless otherwise stated, all statistical calcula-
tions use weights inversely proportional to the probability of a given household having been selected.  
17We depart in one respect from the administrative regional sub-division: on geographical and agro-ecological 
grounds, Zebediela sub-district is included in our ‘South’.  
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dry, with extensive livestock production the dominant farming activity, although some 
dryland maize and other crops are produced, in white farms under borehole irrigation. 
White-owned farms include game and beef ranches and large-scale potato, vegetable and 
citrus producers. A typical white commercial farm neighbouring Phalala or Mokerong 
employs 100-200 full-time workers, generating substantial African employment.  
•  ‘Central’ (sub-districts Seshego and Bochum) villages enjoy effective transport links 
with Polokwane; many household members work (and spend) there or in Pretoria, 2.5 
hours by road. Farming is mainly a residual activity, with some livestock and limited 
cropping.  
• ‘South’ (sub-districts Zebediela, Schoonoord and Praktiseer) villages are the most remote, 
located deep in ex-homelands, far from white-owned farms. Farming features variable 
dryland maize and sorghum production with limited livestock. Zebediela, however, also 
has a large citrus estate and some small-scale irrigated vegetable production. 
3.2 Incomes, assets and unemployment at all-sample level 
Here we show that Limpopo, alongside high land inequality, 18 has a profile of rural African 
livelihoods characterized by low average shares, in total income, of agricultural income, and 
indeed of local income as a whole. The latter implies dependence on external (i.e. non-local) 
incomes in the form of pensions and remittances. We use data from a parallel survey in dry-
land areas of Rajasthan [Sagar 2002] to illustrate a more typical profile, with roughly similar 
agro-ecology to Limpopo, somewhat lower income and higher poverty - but much more wide-
spread access to farmland and water. In both surveys, three village clusters were selected, 
with contrasting rainfall in the range 35-55 cm, in each case with a marked rainy season.
                                                 
18African tenancy had little impact on land access in Limpopo. On white farms it was prohibited, though this did 
not prevent some ‘labour tenancy’. In African areas tenancy is minimal, due to customary law. 
 Table 2: Assets, income, landedness and poverty: whole sample. 
 
 
 
hhinc 
 
aeqinc  
 
hhwea 
 
aeqwea 
   o/w   
   
 
wages 
% of 
hhinc civser* 
 
pens 
% of 
hhinc 
 
farm 
% of 
hhinc 
 
remit 
% of 
hhinc   
 
land 
% of 
wealth 
 
smallstock 
% of 
wealth 
 
largestock 
% of 
wealth 
 
dwellings 
% of 
wealth 
 
hhassts 
% of 
wealth 
 
fmassts 
% of 
wealth 
Limpopo                
total 19504 5487 39.1 (14.5) 17.8 4.3 38.8 53902 15214 4.6 3.3 11.0 63.8 13.8 3.4 
landed (57%) 19572 5287 30.8  20.9 6.8 41.6 61842 16276 7.0 4.3 16.0 56.6 10.8 5.2 
landless (43%) 19454 5753 50.2  13.7 1.0 35.2 43318 13799 0.0 1.5 1.6 77.6 19.3 0.0 
nonpoor (80%)23263 6641 39.2  16.5 3.9 40.5 58601 17092 4.0 3.1 12.2 62.0 14.7 3.9 
poor (20%) 4672 935 37.8  42.9 12.4 6.8 35360 7805 8.5 4.6 3.3 75.8 7.7 0.1 
                
Rajasthan                
total 42792 11083 44.8  (0.0) 4.0 38.4 12.8 300200 77724 64.2 3.3 2.1 25.4 1.3 3.7 
landed (93%) 43903 11234 43.7  3.7 39.8 12.8 318678 82251 64.9 3.3 2.1 24.8 1.3 3.7 
landless (7%) 27525 9004 67.9  10.0 9.0 13.1 46181 15491 0.0 9.1 4.2 83.1 2.9 0.8 
nonpoor (71%)54456 14064 45.7  4.3 36.2 13.9 336307 86249 64.0 3.5 2.0 25.7 1.4 3.4 
poor (29%) 
 
14471 3843 36.8  1.5 58.7 3.0 212527 57024 65.0 2.8 2.4 24.0 1.0 4.7 
 
* Civil service wages 
Notes: 
(a) All estimates are weighted means, with weights inversely proportional to selection probabilities;  
(b) 'hhinc' is income per household; 'aeqinc' is income per resident adult equivalent: the no of aes per household is defined as (adults plus 
0.5*children)^0.5; 'remit' is remittance income in goods and cash; 'pens' is pensions; 'farm' is sales of agricultural produce plus estimated production 
for own-consumption; 'hhwea' and 'aeqwea' are wealth per household and per adult equivalent; 'hhassts' are household assets; 'fmassts' are inanimate 
farm assets. 
(c) Asset valuations are those provided by respondents, except for livestock (valued at prevailing market prices) and land in Limpopo (valued at 1500 
Rand/ha). 
Table 2 gives income and asset statistics, disaggregated by poverty and landholding status, for 
the Limpopo and Rajasthan surveys.19 The disparity in the shares of income from different 
sources is striking. We divide income into wages, farm income, pensions and remittances, 
treating the first two of these as income from ‘local’ factors and the other two from ‘external’ 
factors; we later subdivide wages by sector. In rural Rajasthan,20 83% of income is local (so 
pensions and remittances play, on average, a minor role); in Limpopo,21 only 43% of income 
is local. The big difference is in own-farm income: 38% in Rajasthan and only 4% in Limpopo. 
Agricultural wages22 account for a further 3% in Rajasthan and 4% in Limpopo, so local agricul-
ture accounts for 41% and 8% of income respectively, though the low Limpopo figure hides sharp 
regional differences (Section 3.4). Further, the similar shares of wages, and of non-agricultural 
wages, 23 conceal an important difference between the RNF sectors. In Rajasthan, of the 45% of 
income from wages, none derives from civil service employment; in Limpopo the wages share is 
39%, over a third of which (14% of all income) is so derived. This suggests that the relative insig-
nificance of (former homeland) agriculture in Limpopo is accompanied by relative weakness in 
the RNF sector. This is confirmed by greater RNF activity in the less ‘deagriculturalised’ West 
region. 
The minor role in livelihoods of own-farm output is underscored for Limpopo by a comparison of 
landless and landed households.24 Though an estimated 43% of Limpopo households are land-
                                                 
19At PPP exchange rates, sample income per adult equivalent is 50% higher in Limpopo than in Rajasthan. Using 
the official rural poverty line in Rajasthan, household poverty incidences are respectively 20% and 29%. 
20Henceforth we omit the qualifiers; our surveys are restricted to rural dryland areas in both cases and addition-
ally to former homeland areas in Limpopo. 
21Our ‘income’ measure is imperfect. We estimate production for own-consumption using household reports of 
the fraction of needs so met. Farm income is defined as production for own-consumption plus sales, i.e. without 
subtracting input purchases, on which data were unavailable . 
22This risks double-counting if smallholders earn wages on each other’s farms (rather than on large commercial 
farms, as happens to an unknown extent in Limpopo), so the totals given are likely to be overestimates. 
23Estimated employment in agriculture, including self-employment, is only 22% of all rural employment in Lim-
popo (about 44% in Rajasthan). The employment numbers, estimated from individuals who reported a sector of 
work, must be treated with caution; some individuals may have failed to report a sector of work, even though 
they work on their own land. 
24Access to common grazing land is not taken into account in our measure of landholding. However, absence of 
cropland is strongly associated with lack of livestock, and therefore with lack of benefits from common grazing. 
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less, these average no less income than the landed.25 In Rajasthan, where only 7% of house-
holds are landless, they average 37% less income than the landed. The small economic role of 
own-account farmland for African households in Limpopo is emphasised by their compara-
tively low share of wealth held in the form of land (table 2).26 It is not that these households 
are without land area: the 43% with land average 2.9ha (93% and 1.7ha in Rajasthan) and dis-
tribution among landed households is reasonably even (Gini=0.35), but this dryland has low 
productive capacity, being largely unirrigated. With rainfall scanty and unreliable, purchased 
farm inputs (which are widely available) are seen by Limpopo smallholders as too costly or 
risky, given credit costs and constraints; for many decades, land, rural power, irrigation, credit 
and research were heavily steered towards large farms – much more so than in Rajasthan, 
where smallholders purchase many farm inputs, including appropriate improved seeds and ir-
rigation. 
Though landedness within this former ‘homelands’ area does not increase average income, it 
might reduce poverty risk (for instance, landedness might reduce income variance). To assess 
this, we use a poverty line comparable to that used for Rajasthan.27 It happens to identify 
about 20% of the Limpopo households as income-poor. Landed households have higher esti-
mated poverty than landless ones (23% versus 16%, p=0.11); a finer disaggregation of house-
holds by land size suggests no significant association with poverty risk either way, in contrast 
to the strong negative relationship shown in several other developing countries [Ravallion and 
                                                 
25The null of equality of income per household between landed and landless households cannot be rejected in 
Limpopo, but is rejected in Rajasthan at the 1% level. 
26The asset value and share estimates must be treated with caution; see Table 2, note (c). In the Limpopo ex-
homeland area, land is rarely traded; the assumed value (1500 Rand/ha) is based on market prices for compara-
ble land in adjacent commercial farming areas [Department of Land Affairs, 2002a]. Livestock aside, other asset 
valuations in Rajasthan and Limpopo are by household respondents. 
27Our poverty line is the rural expenditure per person needed in Rajasthan to achieve the Indian poverty line [Dr. 
S. Sharma, Delhi School of Economics, pers. comm., using 1999-2000 round, National Sample Survey]. We 
converted this into Rand using the PPP exchange rate. In both Rajasthan and Limpopo we used sample mean 
adult equivalents per household to convert the per person line into a per-aeq line, which for Limpopo is 1594 
Rand/aeq/yr. Lacking expenditure data for Limpopo we had to ignore below-poverty-line differences between 
expenditure and income. 
 15
Sen 1994; IFAD 2001:76].28 To sum up: land distribution within this former African home-
land taken as a whole does not appear, on its own, to explain variation in household income 
or poverty risk. This fits in with the low share of own-farm income in household income.  
In most of the few cases (mainly in West Africa) where landed rural households are no better 
off than the landless, it is because the latter have moved from low-productivity farming into 
local non-farm activities. This is not the case in the Limpopo survey areas, so the lack of sur-
veyed welfare differences between landed and other households within these areas is surpris-
ing. A major explanation (Appendix) may be that the penning-up of over 60% of Limpopo’s 
farmland with barely 2% of farms - often in other areas – has led to the pre-emption, by these 
farms and areas, of the lion’s share of irrigation, improved technology and modern inputs. 
Hence landholding in the ex-homelands on average yields little income (while the growth of 
an African RNFS is hampered by the absence of much local demand for rural non-farm pro-
duction). 
Some support for this is provided by our later disaggregation by region. This shows that for a 
minority of regionally concentrated non-poor households (in West), the possession of large 
livestock and inanimate farm assets is important to livelihoods, and strongly correlated with 
size of landholding (section. 3.4). That escape from poverty through agriculture in Limpopo is 
possible may have important implications for the possible benefits to be derived from land re-
form, and from research or infrastructure provision that raises the productivity of small-
holders’ land and other farm assets. 
If landlessness as such is not responsible for poverty on average, what is? Are Limpopo’s 
poor special in terms of income structure or asset structure (table 2)? The poor derive a simi-
lar mean share of income from wages as the non-poor,29 but a larger share from pensions and 
                                                 
28In Rajasthan too, there is a strong negative association between poverty risk and landholding. 
29Compare Rajasthan, where the poor, of whom only 7% are landless, derive a high share of income from farm-
ing and a correspondingly low share from wages. 
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a smaller share from migrant remittances. As will be shown, these averages are a manifesta-
tion of (a) sharp specialisation by income-source among households in general, and (b) rela-
tively high and relatively low poverty incidence, respectively, among households mainly de-
pendent on pensions and on migrancy.30 On assets, table 2 shows that poor households on av-
erage hold low shares in productive non-land farm assets, especially large livestock and in-
animate farm assets. Ownership of such assets is highly skewed. The Gini of wealth is 0.48, 
but the concentration indices for farm assets and largestock are 0.89 and 0.80 respectively.31 
Only about one household in six has any inanimate farm assets at all, and only one in six has 
any large livestock; one in sixteen has both, and poverty in this subgroup is essentially zero.  
Is it worklessness that explains the bulk of poverty? Our survey indicates extremely high un-
employment among working-age persons for rural Limpopo (table 3). 8%, though not dis-
abled, were ‘not seeking work’; we count these ‘discouraged workers’ as unemployed, as well 
as those so reporting. Estimated unemployment is then 60% for males and 70% for males and 
females together. An estimated 60% of households have nobody of working age employed 
(we call such households ‘workless’, not quite accurately). Given the high mean share of 
wages in income and the low salience of farm incomes, one might assume that poverty would 
be concentrated in workless households; its incidence is indeed somewhat higher in them, al-
though not very significantly (23% compared to 16% in working households, p=0.14). Yet in-
come per adult equivalent in workless households is, on average, no less than in households 
with one working individual of working age. The implication, examined below, is that mean 
income shares are obscuring a specialisation among households, whereby worklessness (or 
wagelessness) is associated with higher incomes from remittances and/or pensions. 
                                                 
30Depth of poverty, however, is significantly lower for pension-dependent households (defined below; estimated 
mean income per adult equivalent among the poor is 23% below the poverty line) than for others (around 50%).  
31The concentration index is analogous to the Gini. For instance the associated Lorenz curve for, say, largestock 
has households ordered by wealth on the x-axis and the cumulative share of total largestock on the y-axis. 
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Table 3: Working age residents in Limpopo sample 
 
 
Males and females             
 Hh has no pen or remit inc Hh has pension income Hh has remittance income All households 
 Freq. Percent se Freq. Percent se Freq. Percent se Freq. Percent se 
missing/other 9 1.3 0.54 24 1.52 0.4 16 1.69 0.5 41 1.44 0.29 
housewife 42 11.6 1.89 37 8.15 1.65 41 11.44 2.03 102 10.07 1.14 
studying 133 24.66 2.42 182 25.11 2.18 210 28.80 2.34 450 26.63 1.46 
unemployed 184 32.14 2.57 290 43.40 2.52 272 39.84 2.54 642 38.63 1.59 
employed 179 29.45 2.38 80 8.42 1.14 84 9.67 1.29 327 16.32 1.06 
retired/disabled 7 0.85 0.41 85 13.39 1.8 49 8.56 1.64 104 6.91 0.89 
 
Total 
 
 
554 
 
100  
 
698 
 
100  
 
672 
 
100  
 
1666 
 
100  
 
Males             
 Hh has no pen or remit inc Hh has pension income Hh has remittance income All households 
 Freq. Percent se Freq. Percent se Freq. Percent se Freq. Percent se 
missing/other 3 1.74 1.13 12 1.98 0.74 10 3.21 1.24 18 1.88 0.58 
housewife 0 0.00  1 1.46 1.44 0 0.00  1 0.67 0.67 
studying 57 25.23 3.71 92 32.64 3.78 90 40.30 4.58 203 32.43 2.53 
unemployed 62 24.09 3.6 117 42.47 3.97 95 37.01 4.33 235 35.01 2.5 
employed 121 47.26 4.09 41 10.99 2.1 31 11.10 2.44 185 23.85 2.03 
retired/disabled 4 1.70 0.97 22 10.47 2.8 10 8.37 3.39 29 6.16 1.51 
 
Total 
 
 
247 
 
100  
 
285 
 
100  
 
236 
 
100  
 
671 
 
100  
male unemployment rate 
 
 33.80%   79.40%   77.00%   59.50%  
 
 Table 4: Three way split: demography, income and assets 
 Shares Demography    
  Residents AEQ Wkage WkageM WkageF 
All 100.0% 6.29(.15) 4.17(.09) 3.19(.09) 1.26(.06) 1.93(.06) 
FR 38.5% 6.80(.22) 4.42(.13) 3.53(.13) 1.51(.09) 2.02(.08) 
PD 26.8% 6.80(.34) 4.58(.18) 3.30(.19) 1.41(.16) 1.88(.14) 
MD 32.3% 5.30(.22) 3.55(.13) 2.73(.15) 0.88(.11) 1.85(.10) 
Other 2.3%      
       
FRpoor 28.8% 7.46(.40) 4.76(.22) 3.73(.23) 1.32(.20) 2.41(.15) 
FRn-poor 71.2% 6.53(.26) 4.28(.15) 3.44(.15) 1.58(.09) 1.86(.09) 
PDpoor 26.3% 8.34(.68) 5.48(.29) 4.55(.20) 2.30(.33) 2.25(.25) 
PDn-poor 73.7% 6.25(.38) 4.26(.21) 2.85(.21) 1.09(.12) 1.75(.17) 
MDpoor 6.3% 6.37(.59) 3.77(.36) 2.38(.34) 0.52(.25) 1.87(.18) 
MDn-poor 93.7% 5.22(.23) 3.53(.14) 2.75(.16) 0.90(.12) 1.85(.10) 
 Incomes      
 Mean/HH Mean/AEQ %Pens %Remit %Wages %Farm 
All 19504(1394) 5487(418)     
FR 20523(2929) 5089(696) 4.0 2.9 87.6 5.5 
PD 10827(694) 2662(227) 79.2 10.0 5.2 5.6 
MD 25068(2100) 8204(821) 8.6 84.1 5.0 2.2 
FRpoor 3694(484) 758(85) 1.3 0.0 80.5 18.2 
FRn-poor 27342(3900) 6844(915) 4.1 3.1 88.0 4.8 
PDpoor 6639(332) 1226(43) 85.4 0.1 5.8 8.7 
PDn-poor 12326(795) 3177(263) 77.9 12.0 5.1 5.0 
MDpoor 3198(535) 889(153) 0.0 97.2 0.0 2.8 
MDn-poor 26546(2132) 8698(847) 8.7 84.0 5.1 2.2 
 Assets        
 
HH wealth AEQ wealth 
 
  
land 
% wealth 
smallstock 
% wealth 
largestock 
% wealth 
dwellings 
% wealth 
hh assts 
% wealth 
fm assts 
% wealth 
All 53902 15214 4.6 3.3 11.0 63.8 13.8 3.4 
         
FR 57258(5315) 14893(1903) 3.9(.5) 2.3(.4) 12.9(2.3) 57.9(3.6) 15.9(1.8) 7.1(2.3) 
PD 52450(6081) 13576(1972) 6.2(.8) 5.1(.1) 12.0(5.7) 64.5(6.1) 12.1(2.3) 0.0(0) 
MD 49774(4436) 16640(2129) 4.2(.7) 3.4(.7) 6.2(2.3) 72.4(3.3) 12.7(2.2) 1.1(.5) 
 selected data only, provided below      
FRpoor     4.8(3.7)   0 
FRn-poor     14.4(2.6)   8.5(2.7) 
PDpoor     2.3(1.5)   0.2(0.2) 
PDn-poor     14.2(6.8)   0 
MDpoor     0   0 
MDn-poor     6.5(2.4)   1.2(.6) 
Note: Shares of income from principal source: PD 79.1%; MD 84.1%;FR 93.0%; Ginis of income/aeq:  
PD 31%, MD 42%, FR 56%. Wkage=number of working age residents (M=male, F=female),  
HH=household, AEQ=adult equivalent. 
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3.3 Income-source specialisation of livelihoods: a three-way split  
We have shown the sharp contrast between Limpopo and Rajasthan in terms of average in-
come measures of rural dependency: 43% versus 83% for the local income share, and 29% 
versus 83% for the local income share excluding civil service income. Another dimension of 
high rural dependency in Limpopo is a remarkable specialisation of households by income 
source. If shares of local, remittance and pension incomes of, respectively, 43%, 39% and 
18% reflected household diversification and risk-reduction in face of weak local income pros-
pects, many households would live on a mix of income sources corresponding very roughly to 
the aggregate shares; few would be ‘specialised’ to the extent of deriving over half their in-
come from just one of these sources. Yet, on this definition, an estimated 98% of the house-
holds are specialised: 39% are factor-reliant (FR), averaging 93% of income local; 32% are 
migrancy-dependent (MD), averaging 84% of income from remittances; and 27% of house-
holds are pension-dependent (PD), averaging 79% of income from pensions. The demograph-
ics, while of interest, do not explain dependency: proportions of working-age persons in PD, 
MD and FR households differ little (0.49, 0.52 and 0.52 respectively: table 4).32 
This striking distinctness, or ‘three-way-split’, of households may account for some earlier 
findings. If high non-local incomes were associated with low local incomes (and high unem-
ployment), then a weak or absent link between poverty and worklessness or landlessness 
might result.33 Our Limpopo data exhibit these associations. Estimated rank correlation coef-
ficients between ‘local’ income (farm income plus wages) and pensions and remittances re-
spectively are minus 0.297(p=0.000) and minus 0.308(p=0.000).34 
                                                 
32
 As for gender, the female/male ratio is 2.10 in MD households as against 1.34 for FRs. However, this is proba-
bly an effect of selective male migration, not a cause of MD status. 
33The weak association may also be partly due to offsetting effects of much higher unemployment among both 
households with pensions (which have high poverty incidence) and with migrancy income (which have little 
poverty) than among households with neither.  
34A rank correlation test is more appropriate than a linear one given the highly bunched nature of the data (many 
zeroes). The correlation for local income against (pensions plus remittances) was –0.44 (p=0.000). The same 
tests on our Rajasthan sample give a very small positive, insignificant correlation between local income and pen-
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For a further test, we divided the sample according to whether pension and remittance income 
together were sufficient to push the household above the poverty line; about half the sample 
are ‘externally subsistent’ on this definition. Local income in externally subsistent households 
averages only 18% of local income in other households (76% in Rajasthan, where 11% of 
households are externally subsistent).  
So the negative association between external and local incomes is strong in Limpopo. To test 
the association between external income sources and unemployment - while avoiding the se-
lection bias that automatically links FR-households with lower unemployment - we reclassi-
fied households, not as FR-PD-MD, but according to whether they had any pension income 
(43%) or any remittance income (45%; 18% have both). In line with the income correlations, 
the male unemployment rates in pension-receiving and remittance-receiving households are 
similar, in the range 75-80% (table 3), against 34% in the 30% of households with no such ex-
ternal income.35 This association is robust to the inclusion of controls, as shown in the probit 
analysis (table 5) of individual employment status on education status, region and whether or 
not the household is in receipt of pension or remittance income. For example, a working-age 
male in a pension-receiving household has an employment probability 34.4% lower than in a 
non-pension-receiving household in the same region and similar in education. The corre-
sponding figure for a member of a remittance-receiving household is 28.5%. Note also that (a) 
while higher education substantially raises employment chances, secondary education reduces 
them, and (b) living in West is much better for employment prospects than living in South or 
Central. 
                                                                                                                                                        
sions and small negative correlations between local income and, respectively, remittances (rho=-0.12, p=.003) 
and pensions (rho=-0.10, p=0.02) 
35As one would expect (because the definitions of PD and MD select households that have little local income and 
accordingly low employment of residents), the male unemployment rates in the PD and MD households that to-
gether account for 59 %t of all households are even higher, at 93% and 92% . 
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Table 5. Male employment and non-local household incomes 
 p-values Means of regressors 
 
Marginal effects 
(%: s.e in brackets)  (%)  
Highest education:     
Primary -0.9(1.0) 0.371 93.7 
Secondary -9.3(0.5) 0 64.4 
Higher 25.2(1.0) 0 6.6 
Pension-recipient hh -34.4(0.4) 0 41.4 
Remittance-recipient hh -28.5(0.4) 0 27.9 
Resident of South -21.2(0.7) 0 16.4 
Resident of Central -12.0(0.7) 0 68.5 
 
Pseudo R-sq=15.7% 
   
 
Why are resident adult unemployment rates so much higher in pension/remittance receiving 
households? Suppose first that resident household composition is exogenous (so that unem-
ployment does not make the unemployed likelier to shift into such households). Then an ex-
ternal income source may reduce the incentive for residents to seek work in either household 
type, increasing their unemployment rate (recall that we count able-bodied adult non-work-
seekers as unemployed, ‘discouraged workers’). But why, then, are recipients of pensions and 
remittances more willing to share income with unemployed residents than are recipients of lo-
cal factor incomes? For households reliant on remittances, migrancy may be cyclical, so that 
household members take turns to migrate for work. That apart, if the relatively competent 
(and educated) tend to migrate, then those left behind are more likely to be unable to find 
work even if they are motivated to do so. This still leaves the question of why pensioners are 
willing to share income with fellow-adults with unemployment rates so far above those in 
households receiving neither pensions nor remittances. Now allow for endogeneity in house-
hold composition - an impact of income types upon decisions about household formation, 
modification and destruction. Households unable to provide a minimum of subsistence to 
their members must collapse; conversely working-age individuals, especially if unemployed, 
may try (perhaps successfully) to attach themselves to viable households, including those de-
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pendent on non-local income. Perhaps, especially in PD households, such attachments involve 
an element of coercion.  
What do we learn about rural dependency from the mean characteristics of the dependent 
households of each type (Table 4)? There are significant differences in income per adult 
equivalent among the three groups. MDs are 60% better off on average than FRs, who are 
themselves twice as well off as PDs. Poverty incidence (only 6% for MD households) is a lit-
tle higher for FRs than for PDs, 29% versus 26% - and FRs’ mean poverty depth is also far 
higher, despite their much higher mean income than PDs. This reflects much higher income 
inequality among FR households than among PD households, as would be expected (Ginis in 
table 4). However, we do not find significant mean wealth differences among the groups. As 
far as wealth shares are concerned, there is a hint that farm assets (for FR households) and 
largestock (for FR and PD households) may be associated with absence of poverty.36 How-
ever, this does not benefit many households, since holdings of both these assets are highly 
concentrated. It seems that such limited degree of household ‘escape’ from rural dependency 
to factor reliance as is possible without land redistribution in Limpopo (a) brings more pro-
ductive (but riskier?) wealth, not more wealth; (b) raises mean income and cuts poverty, but 
leaves a group of very poor households behind.  
                                                 
36The poor have a higher share in dwellings, consistent with the presence of capital market imperfections that 
may prevent even the landed poor from escaping poverty through more effective land use. 
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Table 6: Regional disparities in Limpopo 
 Central South West 
No of hhs 128 244 121 
Income    
HH income (Rand) 13401(932) 19900(1893) 26784(3036) 
AEQ income (Rand) 3838(401) 5727(567) 6617(727) 
poverty 22.50% 21.10% 11.10% 
%wages 41.90% 37.10% 46.10% 
      of which, agriculture 0.40% 0.40% 19.80% 
      of which, civil service 26.10% 14.99% 0.00% 
%pens 31.40% 16.50% 12.90% 
%farm 2.60% 2.80% 12.80% 
%remit 24.10% 43.60% 28.20% 
%local, non-civil-service* 18.40% 24.91% 58.90% 
Wealth    
HH wealth 72373(8673) 45061(3340) 80126(7410) 
AEQ wealth 21137(3696) 12943(1251) 20063(2024) 
Land    
prop. Landed 0.56 0.52 0.91 
mean landholding(landed) 2.52(.39) 3.08(.18) 2.27(.09) 
land Gini (landed) 0.56(.020) 0.29(.019) 0.23(.014) 
Three-way split    
FR 30.6 39.8 43.0 
PD 44.1 24.8 11.7 
MD 25.2 33.6 35.6 
Mixed-source 0.0 1.8 9.7 
Farming assets    
% with largestock 12.5 13.7 33.5 
% with inanimate fm. assets 2.3 11.4 80.0 
% with both fm. asset types 2.3 4.0 30.2 
Unemployment    
All 77.3% 71.8% 60.4% 
Men 69.3% 59.0% 50.9% 
* share of farming plus non-civil-service wages 
Note: estimated standard errors in brackets. Abbreviations as in Table 4 
 
3.4 Regional variations: agriculture and livelihoods in West 
Our survey data (table 6) reveal significant regional variations, especially between West and 
the other two regions. In short, West is the most prosperous region: poverty incidence is about 
half that in the other two regions, and unemployment is markedly lower.37 Only in West does 
agriculture account for a substantial fraction of income, both through own-farm production 
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and agricultural wages, and only in West are there important holdings of large livestock and 
inanimate farm assets. Households that own both of these assets do well. To a considerable 
extent, it is more widespread access to higher local factor incomes from farming that makes 
African households somewhat better off in West than elsewhere in Limpopo.  
As regards the comparative importance of agriculture to income in the three regions, adding 
own-farm income to agricultural wages shows that agriculture in Central and South accounts 
for no more than 3% of income, but 32% in West, of which about a third is own-farm income. 
Agriculture accounts for 5% of employment (including self-employment) in Central, 14% in 
South, and 52% in West. In West (a) wider access by Africans to small, family-labour-
intensive holdings offers prospects of higher, more diffused own-farm income; (b) white-
owned land used for game and beef ranches, and borehole-irrigated maize and potato produc-
tion – even if not always near the survey areas - offers better chances for African farm wage 
income than in other regions, though less than would be the case with smaller-scale farming 
of this land. 
So agriculture is important to livelihoods in West through both own-farm income and wages. 
The special nature of West is also revealed in asset structures. West has no advantage over 
other regions in cropland per average landed household, but (as in Rajasthan) over 90% of 
households have some cropland; in South and Central the proportion is just over half. Among 
the landed, cropland is somewhat more equal in West than in South, and much more than in 
Central; and ownership of livestock and other farm assets is much greater in West than in 
South or Central. Hence a much larger proportion of households has modest but significant 
cropland in West: 87% of landed households (80% of all households) there have between one 
and four hectares, as against only 51% (27%) elsewhere. Landedness as such has been shown 
to have little direct effect on income at household level, but we can discern an indirect effect 
                                                                                                                                                        
37The 1995 Central Statistical Services’s Household Survey confirms this picture [Gyekye and Akinloye 2001] 
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through other farm assets, especially inanimate farm assets and large livestock. Holdings of 
these two types of asset are highly skewed and highly correlated (Spearman rank correlation 
coefficient = 0.3845, p = 0.0000). Outside West, relatively few households report holding any 
assets in each of these categories, (table 6). As for holders of assets in both categories, they 
comprise only 2.3% of households in Central, 4.0% in South and 30.2% in West. The chance 
of a household having both largestock and inanimate farm assets is strongly related to land-
holding: virtually no households with less than 1 ha are in this category.38 This category of 
households does very well as regards both income and poverty risk: average income is double 
that earned in other households and poverty incidence is virtually zero.39  
What of escape from rural dependency through RNF incomes? We cannot measure the extent 
to which these in West are underpinned by demand from agricultural incomes, but virtually 
all non-agricultural local wages in this region are generated in industry and services - in Cen-
tral and South, 62% and 40% respectively of wages derive from civil service employment.40 
Hence, despite the high share of income deriving from agriculture in West, the share of in-
come deriving from industry plus service-sector wages is higher than in Central or South 
(26% compared to 16% and 22%). Total income from local, non-civil-service activity ac-
counts for 59% of total income in West (Central 18%, South 25%, 83% in Rajasthan).  
In sum, rural dependency in West, though substantial, is lower than in Central and South. 
47% of households are MD or PD households (69% in Central and South; 11% in Rajasthan). 
West represents, in some senses, a bridge between the rest of Limpopo’s experience and that 
of Rajasthan, being intermediate in both the spread of farmland, and reliance on local income 
sources. This suggests that, with agricultural development and land redistribution, rural de-
pendency may be reversible elsewhere in the African areas of South Africa. However, these 
                                                 
38Both living in West and landholding are strongly associated with both the possession of inanimate farm assets 
and livestock and the quantity possessed. 
39Point estimate 1.6% (2 sample households).  
40Including teachers but not parastatal employment. 
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special features of West (and the hopes they engender) should not be overstated. African 
farmland, though more widely spread than in other areas, remains, even in West, much less 
(and worse) than white-owned farmland, and largely without water control or modern inputs 
(in sharp contrast to Rajasthan). Even in West, African farming accounts for only 13% of vil-
lage income. White farmland, while providing some wage income, is generally farmed in 
large and capital-intensive units. Much remains to be done before African households in rural 
South Africa can escape rural dependency. 
4. Summary and policy implications 
Cross-sections of developing and transitional countries show a very strong association be-
tween land inequality and agricultural workforce share, given GNP/capita. Historical evidence 
of dramatic land concentration in early development suggests that this may reflect a causal 
process in individual countries, whereby land grabs have led to premature deagriculturalisa-
tion. The Limpopo ex-homeland survey illustrates the impact on rural livelihoods. Shares of 
income and assets associated with agriculture are very low (8% and 22%); half the households 
derive less than one-fifth of income from any local sources; 59% of households ‘specialize’ in 
dependency on either migrant or pension income; male unemployment is also 59%, and much 
higher in the ‘specialist’ households; farmland-per-household is as much as 2.8 hectares 
among the 57% with cropland, but the landed are no better off than the landless in terms of 
poverty risk or income. Such outcomes are less marked in West region (with more widely 
spread farmland), and are almost absent in a parallel survey in Rajasthan. 
What implications have these findings for policy change in rural S Africa? Experience in 
many countries confirms the feasibility of poverty reduction via land redistribution, and of 
subsequent growth in farm output and employment. About 3 in 4 of S Africa's dollar-poor are 
rural, almost all being Africans in former ‘homelands’ such as our survey area; rural poverty 
incidence is highest in Limpopo and the Eastern Cape provinces, where 44% of S Africa's 
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poor reside [Development Bank of Southern Africa 2000]. Given the many unemployed rural 
poor, is land redistribution a useful tool of poverty reduction, as well as of farm efficiency?  
Consensual transfer of one-third of commercial farmland to poor Africans was part of the Af-
rican National Congress’s manifesto in 1994. Some efforts were made in pilots, but usually 
with scanty supporting inputs or services, and focusing on land for welfare and housing, 
rather than for smallholder farming. Although the World Bank had made clear its support, and 
potential financing role, for wide-scale, consensual land redistribution [Van Zyl, Kirsten and 
Binswanger, 1996], the Government did not implement this widely or very effectively. Still, 
‘a survey of about 1200 beneficiaries..[shows that, though initial land reform]..has not lived 
up to the quantitative goals set, [it] did successfully target the poor [and] led to a significant 
number of economically successful projects..[that] have involved significantly larger shares of 
poor people than less viable projects, suggesting that increased access to productive assets 
could be an important path to poverty reduction..[S]uitably adapted land reform could play an 
important part in restructuring South Africa's rural sector’ [Deininger and May 2000]. How-
ever, subsequently, the Government largely replaced that approach by efforts to individualise 
communal tenure; to broaden ownership of white farms through ‘equity sharing’; and, above 
all, to obtain voluntary transfer of some white-owned farmland into middle-to-large African 
commercial farms [Wegerif 2004]. Such a transfer will not achieve the full gains to the poor, 
and reductions in dependency and unemployment, that appear, from cross-sections, to be pos-
sible by a shift from larger to smaller farms.  
An objection to such a shift [Reardon and Barrett 2000] is that commercialisation has margin-
alised small-scale farmers in developing countries, excluding them from the profitable mar-
kets of the rich North. However, South Africa's African-run farms are mostly net buyers of 
food, so that extra output is home-consumed, or cater mainly for local markets, so that prob-
lem is less important. Where small farmers do sell for exports and supermarkets, intermedia-
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tion may be needed to facilitate timely collection for processing, crop uniformity, pesticide 
safety, or labour standards; where this is successfully achieved, including in some African 
cases (tea in Kenya, cotton in Burkina), smaller farms’ advantages resurface. But successful 
intermediation may not be profitable, and even if it is cannot be taken for granted without 
public or collective action.  
The merits of land redistribution in any specific case cannot be assumed. Can South Africa (or 
Russia), with farming already settled into severe asset and input inequality, consensually 
‘undo history’ and improve outcomes by reverting to a more equal small-farm model? Will 
disruption costs, e.g. with capital assets and water systems geared to large-scale farming, be 
excessive? Can rural people long deprived of land and other relevant resources - and the sup-
ply systems that might service these - operate in a small-farm environment (however attrac-
tive in cross-section), or is it true that peasant sectors ‘when once destroyed, can never be 
supplied’ [Goldsmith 1770]?  
Such questions require assessment of alternatives. Starting from South Africa's very high (and 
genuine) unemployment - with its consequences for failed townward migration, family break-
down and crime - can mass poverty (and slow growth) be tackled without substantial, produc-
tive absorption of labour in small-scale agriculture, and in a rural nonfarm sector linked to its 
growth? Prospects for labour absorption in the urban non-farm sector appear limited, given 
the weak growth, high capital-intensity and low competitiveness of modern manufacturing in 
South Africa, as compared say to Malaysia after its more normal deagriculturalisation. Con-
versely the policy of getting land and other farm resources to an underemployed, but far from 
destroyed, peasantry appears to have proved feasible in a range of cases, both in Latin Amer-
ica and in transition economies (China 1977-84, Vietnam 1988-93, Albania, Armenia and 
Romania). 
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Economic development paths almost always involve deagriculturalisation. Normally, this is of 
a ‘mature’ agricultural sector, following a spurt of labour-intensive agricultural growth, 
mainly on smallholdings. Changing demand patterns (Engel’s Law) and voluntary savings 
transfers out of agriculture then make it attractive and feasible for both migrant workers and 
entrepreneurs to shift to modernising industry and services. A different path is premature 
deagriculturalisation. A farm sector, made highly unequal, provides little productive work on 
its large and capital-intensive farms, while its smallholdings lack resources for growth (in S 
Africa water control, research, and marketing systems). Labour floods from such a sector to 
the towns, but the sources of investment finance, adequate to employ it, are not clear. Our 
findings support much development theory and empirical work indicating that there is seldom 
an obvious alternative, if seeking broad-based growth, to a path through small-scale agricul-
ture and related RNF activity. The experience of Rajasthan - and to a lesser extent of West re-
gion in Limpopo - suggests that such a path is feasible. 
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Appendix   
 
(a) Estimating the land Gini in Limpopo Province.  
 
(1) The size distribution of white-owned farms is estimated from Census of Agriculture 1993, 
p.4, which gives numbers of farms in 14 size categories and allows calculation of mean hold-
ing by category. We assume that all farms within each category are equal-sized.  
 
(2) We assume one million smallholdings in South Africa. The Census gives white commer-
cial farms 87% of 82.76m ha. total farmland. Mean (grazing plus arable) land per smallhold-
ing can then be estimated at 12.37 ha. 
 
(3) We estimate mean arable smallholding size in Limpopo as 2.85ha. Assuming Limpopo 
smallholdings representative of national smallholdings, and the grazing-arable ratio constant 
across Limpopo smallholdings, we scale up the sample holdings by 12.37/2.85 to approximate 
their size distribution. 
  
(4) For total Limpopo smallholdings, we average two estimates: (a) the (Census) rural popula-
tion of 4.5 million, with our sample estimates for mean household size and proportion of 
households landless, gives 0.27 million smallholdings; (b) the (Census) 23% of South Af-
rica’s rural population in Limpopo, implies 0.23 million smallholdings given (2), if provincial 
smallholdings are in proportion to population.  
 
(5) (3) scaled up by (4) gives an estimate of the size distribution of Limpopo smallholdings. 
Amalgamation with (1) gives:  
 
 
 Mean size (hec-
tares) 
Number Total land (million ha) Gini 
Commercial farms 1055.9 5053 5.3 0.80 
Smallholdings 12.4 250000 3.1 0.39 
Total 32.9 255053 8.4 0.93 
 
(b) Equalizing land redistribution and farm employment. For non-intersecting Lorenz curves, 
any reduction in land inequality can be represented as a sequence of transfers of land from 
larger to smaller holdings [Sen 1972]. Denote land by N, labour by L and the average and 
marginal labour-land ratios by A(N) and M(N). Then M(N)=A(N)+N.A'(N). A small equaliz-
ing land transfer from a farm of size N1 to a smaller one of size N0 raises labour iff: 
 
M(N0) – M(N1) = {A(N0) - A(N1)} +  N0.A'(N0) - N1.A'(N1) > 0 
 
If A'(N)<0, the term in braces, increased employment on the transferred land, is positive. The 
negative second term, N0.A'(N0), arises from the fall in labour-intensity on the smaller farm 
because of its enlargement, and the positive third term, -N1.A'(N1) from the rise in labour-
intensity on the larger farm because of its shrinkage. The bigger the gap in the labour-land ra-
tio between the 'receiving' and 'giving' farms, the larger is the term in braces and the more 
likely a rise in total employment .  
 
(c) Data sources for table 1. Numbers of agricultural and non-agricultural economic actives in 
2000: FAOSTAT; PPP GNP/capita(1999): World Bank; share of agriculture in GDP (aver-
aged for 1999, 2000, 2001): World Bank; country coverage: all countries classified in the 
2005 WDR as low or middle income, except those with less than 500,000 ha. of agricultural 
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land (table 1.1 of FAO[2001]). Land Ginis are taken from FAO[2001] where possible, other-
wise Deininger/Olinto[2000], or (if clearly more recent) table 3.1 in IFAD [2001], p.117. 
These two sources were mostly in agreement; except for (i) Bangladesh: IFAD’s 0.55 for 
1981-90 was preferred to DO’s 0.42 (equal to IFAD’s 1971-80 figure), and (ii) Mexico: DO’s 
0.61 was preferred to IFAD’s 1961-70 figure of 0.75. 
 
(d) Map 
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